The Foundations of Geometry: Frege and Hilbert on Independence proofs
Hilbert's Foundations of Geometry (1899) is often-and rightly-seen as a landmark in the development of the so-called axiomatic method. One of the main contributions of Hilbert's Foundations is that, for the first time, metatheoretic issues such as the questions of consistency and independence of axioms are systematically investigated in a way that has since become standard. In a famous letter to Frege, he writes:
I was forced to construct my system of axioms by the following necessity: I wanted to provide an opportunity for understanding those geometric propositions which I consider to be the most important products of geometric investigations-that the axiom of parallels is not a consequence of the remaining axioms; similarly the Archimedean axiom; etc. I wanted to answer the question whether it is possible to prove the proposition that two equal rectangles having the same base line also have equal sides. In fact, I wanted to create the possibility of understanding and answering such questions as why the sum of the angles of a triangle is two right angles and how this fact is related to the axioms of parallels. (Kluge 1971, p. 10) Hilbert's perspective in this passage is of decidedly metatheoretical character in the sense that questions about what can and what cannot be proved from some given set of axioms, are posed from a point of view that is external to geometrical investigations. The purpose of Hilbert's axiomatization of geometry was not just to provide an axiomatic basis for geometry from which every geometrical truth could be proved. Rather, from the very beginning, it was aiming at metatheoretical properties of Euclidean geometry and sub-theories of Euclidean geometry.
At the heart of Hilbert's methodology lies his consequent model-theoretic approach to axiom systems.
2 Geometric axioms are no longer seen as true propositions that are immediate from our spatial intuition, but as conditions that are satisfied by some interpretations and not by others. As Hilbert puts it in a famous letter to Frege:
But surely it is self-evident that every theory is merely a framework or schema of concepts together with their necessary relations to one another, and that the basic elements can be construed as one pleases. If I think of my points as a system of other things, e.g. the system of love, of law, or of chimney sweeps . . . and then conceive of my axioms as relations between these things, then my theorems, e.g. the Pythagorean one, will hold of these things as well. In other words, each and every theory can always be applied to infinitely many systems of basic elements. (Kluge 1971, pp. 13-14) Hilbert's model-theoretic approach to axiomatic theories is the key to his independence proofs, for in order to prove the unprovability of some proposition p from other propositions S, one cannot 'go through' all possible proofs and check that none of them is actually a proof of p. Hence, in the absence of proof-theoretical methods in the strict sense of the term, the only way to prove that an axiom p is independent of a set of axioms S is by producing a counter-model, that is, an interpretation in which every axiom in the set S is true, but p is false. The conceptual presupposition for such a strategy seems to be that the domain of the theory S (i.e. the set of objects the theory is supposed to talk about) and its basic terms can be freely reinterpreted. This roughly means that although one may have an 'intended interpretation' in mind when setting up the axioms, intuitions about this intended interpretation have only heuristic value, but they are irrelevant as far as the logical content of the axiomatic theory thereby established is concerned.
Before examining Frege's troubles with this kind of independence proof, let us be clear about what is involved conceptually in independence proofsà la Hilbert. As far as Hilbert is concerned, an independence proof of an axiom p of a set of axioms S is supposed to show that neither p nor ¬p are provable from S, that is, that no sequence of logical inferences might bring us from S to p or its negation.
3 This is done in two steps: first, by providing, relative to some background-theory, an interpretation I with respect to which all axioms in S as well as p come out true, and, second, by providing another interpretation J with respect to which all axioms in S are true while p is false. Here, an interpretation (or reinterpretation) is typically specified by a set of objects D forming the domain of objects of the theory, together with a specification of the denotations of the primitive terms over the given domain D relative to some background theory. 4 Assuming that proof preserves truth under each reinterpretation, we can then see that neither p nor ¬p can be proved from S. For suppose p were provable from S. Then, since S is true under J and proof preserves truth under each reinterpretation, p would have to be true under J as well, which, by assumption, it is not. Hence, p cannot be proved from S. Similarly, suppose that ¬p were provable from S. Then, since S is true under I, ¬p would have to be true under I, which, again, it is not. Hence, ¬p is not provable from S either.
Summing up, in his Foundations, Hilbert seems to be relying on an informal understanding of the following:
(i) the notion of provability (ii) the notion of a reinterpretation, and the notion of truth with respect to a given reinterpretation (iii) that proof preserves truth with respect to a given reinterpretation ('soundness') Hilbert, however, never fully addresses these issues explicitly (at least not during his dispute with Frege) but instead takes them to be part of ordinary mathematics. On Hilbert's view of axioms as conditions that are satisfied by some interpretations and not by others, the independence of axioms can be proved just like any universal statement is refuted: by providing a counter-example. To prove that the statement, 'Every continuous function is differentiable' is false, just give an example of a continuous function that is not differentiable. The same goes for statements like 'Every affine plane is desarguesian', which can be shown to be false by providing an example of an affine plane in which Desargues' theorem (or the 'condition' corresponding to it) does not hold. The choice of this example is no coincidence: those were the kinds of questions that Hilbert wanted to address, questions that have been bothering geometers throughout the nineteenth century and which he apprehends as pertaining to logico-methodological or 'foundational' issues only in a derivative sense. Hilbert's mathematical viewpoint is echoed in his remark:
In recent mathematics, the question of the impossibility of certain solutions or tasks plays an eminent role and the efforts to answer such a question often gives rise to the development of new and fruitful areas of research. We just remind the reader of Abel's proof of the impossibility of solving equations of the fifth degree by root extraction, along with the insight of the unprovability of the axiom of parallels as well as Hermite's and Lindemann's theorems concerning the impossibility of constructing the numbers e and π algebraically.
5
The fact that Hilbert mentions the independence of the axiom of parallels in the same breath as the transcendentality of e and π strongly suggests that he conceives of the independence of axioms in a straightforwardly informal, mathematical way. As we shall see, it is this informality and what Frege perceives as lack of explicitness concerning the conceptual presuppositions displayed in (i)-(iii) from earlier that seem to be Frege's main points of critique. If Hilbert is viewed as a revolutionary, Frege, by contrast, can be considered a conservative with respect to the axiomatic method. In a series of articles entitled 'On the Foundations of Geometry' (see Frege 1903 and 1906) , Frege sets forth a pervasive critique of Hilbert's views and, in particular, repeatedly attacks him for his allegedly inappropriate use of the word 'axiom'.
6 For Frege, an axiom 'in the Euclidean sense' (a locution Frege uses time and again in his articles on geometry) is a true proposition that cannot be proved. From Frege's point of view, a proper axiom has a determinate content and says something about a specific domain. Hence, by fiat, an axiom cannot shown to be false. The notion of being false in an interpretation, on the other hand, to which Hilbert alludes, has to be construed quite differently, since, according to Frege, a proper language leaves no room for interpretation.
7 In Frege's eyes, Hilbert's geometrical axioms are at best 'pseudo-propositions', that is, groups of signs that seemingly express particular thoughts but do so only apparently, because the terms 5 Translated by the Author from Hilbert 1899, p. 111. See also Hilbert 1899, p. 119. 6 The locus classicus on the so-called 'Frege-Hilbert Controversy' is Resnik 1974 . See also Blanchette 1996 , and 2014 , Dummett 1976 , Hallett 2010 , Kambartel 1976 , Ricketts 1997 , Tappenden 1997 , and Wehmaier 1997 . More on the mathematical background can be found e.g. in Tappenden 2006 and Wilson 1992 For more on Frege's and Hilbert's conceptions of language, see Antonelli and May 2000 , Demopoulos 1994 , and Hallett 2010 that occur in them (like 'point', 'straight line', 'congruence') do not designate something specific. But for Frege, not to designate something specific is not to designate at all. Frege consequently understands Hilbert as conceiving of the primitive terms of his axiomatization of geometry as variables in disguise. Whenever a primitive term is 'reinterpreted', what is really going on, according to Frege, is that a variable is instantiated by a meaningful expression (Frege 1906, p. 81) . For instance, let P stand for the axiom of parallels and G for the remaining axioms of Hilbert's axiomatization of Euclidean geometry. Following Frege's reconstruction of what he believes Hilbert has in mind, we arrive at propositional functions P (X, . . . , Y ) and G(X, . . . , Y ), corresponding to P and G respectively, by substituting variables of the appropriate type for the primitive terms 'point', 'straight line', and so on. Thus, Frege believes that Hilbert has proved that the universally quantified conditional
is not valid by constructing a counter-example, that is, a sequence of meaningful terms F, . . . , G that yields a true antecedent but a false consequent when substituted respectively for the variables X, . . . , Y . Hence, as per Frege's recommended reading of Hilbert's method, axioms should explicitly be conceived as conditions expressed by formulas containing free variables, and yielding true or false propositions only when meaningful expressions are substituted for these variables.
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Summing up, it can be said that neither was Frege stubborn in his critique of Hilbert nor did he misunderstand what Hilbert was up to on a large scale: it is just that he did not have the same view of axioms and mathematical truth, and-for reasons that hopefully will become apparent-could not agree with Hilbert's method (even in its reconstructed form) as an adequate method to prove the independence of axioms 'in the Euclidean sense'. More interestingly though, Frege also forms his own proposal as to how independence should be proved in the case of genuine axioms. But before we look more closely at Frege's suggested method, let me once again dwell on one point: for Frege, but not for Hilbert, there is a blatant difference between genuine axioms having a determinate meaning, on the one hand, and-what Frege calls-'pseudo axioms', on the other.
9 In Hilbert's conceptual repertoire, on the other hand, genuine axioms (in the Fregean sense) no longer occur: they are replaced by pseudo axioms. Axioms for Euclidean geometry or the natural numbers are now on a par with axioms for groups, lattices or topological spaces. As a quick look into a modern textbook shows, the mathematical community was glad to follow Hilbert in this shift in mathematical nomenclature. I will not discuss the wide ramifications of this shift for the philosophy of mathematics (for clearly it is not just a shift in terminology), but I simply want to highlight that, for Frege, the difference exists and is important. From Frege's point of view, Hilbert's axiom system can be conceived of in both ways: as a set of conditions or as expressing 'axioms in the Euclidean sense'. Both views have their merits (of course Frege would not recommend using the word 'axiom' in the former case), and the questions of independence between genuine axioms and axioms in the 'algebraic' sense are mutually connected, but they do not amount to the same thing according to Frege. Keeping this distinction in mind is not only important for a faithful interpretation of Frege, but also for evaluating (and appreciating) Frege's own approach to independence proofs. But before we can go deeper into Frege's own proposal, it will be useful to look at some points concerning the background of his suggestion.
Preliminaries to Frege's New Science
We have seen that one of the main targets of Frege's criticism of Hilbert is the fact that, according to Frege, Hilbert's independence arguments lack the kind of stringency that he expects from an argument for it to count as a proof. As Frege claims (1906, p. 111) : 'As it stands, we remain completely in the dark as to what he really believes he has proved and which logical and extralogical laws and expedients he needs for this.' Here again, Frege seems to have in mind Hilbert's talk of interpretations, systems of things and so on (essentially items (i)-(iii) from earlier). It is obvious-at least as far as the 1906 paper is concerned-that Frege finds nothing particularly wrong with the mathematical content of Hilbert's arguments but objects rather to their presentation and the language in which they are framed, specifically the 'interpretation-talk'. This is not only indicated by his remark that 'the question may still be raised whether, taking Hilbert's result as a starting point, we might not arrive at a proof of independence of the real axioms' (Frege 1906, p. 103 ), but it is apparent from the idea behind his own proposal. In particular, Frege, at least in the 1906 paper, offers no qualifications to the effect that proofs of independence are somehow impossible.
10 What is really at stake here is the form that independence arguments concerning real axioms should take in order to count as genuine proofs. So, in order to assess Frege's own proposal, something should be said about Frege's notion of proof.
It is a commonplace that the main aim of Frege's invention of the Begriffsschrift was the rigorization of the concept of mathematical proof.
11 But it is a matter of controversy as to what exactly Frege was up to, if his motivation was driven mainly by mathematical or philosophical interest. What Jamie Tappenden has called 'the myth' is the view that Frege's foundational project was a natural continuation of the rigorization of analysis starting with Cauchy and Weierstrass in the early nineteenth century. According to this view, Frege was interested in laying solid foundations for number theory just like Cauchy and Weierstraß were interested in laying solid foundations for real analysis. On the other hand, as Philip Kitcher mentions, in contrast with the case of analysis, Frege did not answer any pressing needs of mathematicians with his attempt to secure the foundations of number theory. The introduction of exact notions of limit, continuity, differentiability, etc. by Cauchy and Weierstraß in the case of analysis was driven by the simple need for consistency, since intuitive analysis plainly lead to contradictions. The consistency of number theory, on the other hand, was never seriously in question. According to Kitcher, Frege therefore 'advanced an explicitly philosophical call for rigour' (Kitcher 1984, p. 268 10 This seems to be in contrast with some of his remarks dating before and after the 1906 proposal. In a letter to Liebmann from July 1900 (Frege 1976, p. 148) , he writes: 'I have reason to believe that the mutual independence of the Euclidean axioms [emphasis by Frege] cannot be proved.' Another famous quote can be found in Frege's comments on Jourdain, where he explicitly states: 'The unprovability of the axiom of parallels cannot be proved' (Frege 1976, p. 119 ). I will not try to accommodate these remarks with Frege's 1906 proposal in this paper (which I think could be done). Instead, I will focus on Frege's positive account concerning independence proofs in the 1906 article.
11 I will follow the convention of Joan Weiner to italicize the word 'Begriffsschrift' when I use the word to refer to Frege's 1879 book, and to use the word without italics in referring to Frege's logical system. proved using logical laws alone and what can be proved only by appeal to intuition.
What is important for our purposes is that whatever Frege's goal for inventing the Begriffsschrift ultimately was (besides the obvious one just mentioned), the means for establishing this goal was a rigorization of what is involved in mathematical proof. Frege repeatedly criticizes the fact that all too often the mathematician is content when every step in a proof is 'obvious' ('einleuchtend', Frege 1892 ('einleuchtend', Frege -1902 , without checking what the source of this obviousness is. Frege's answer to this problem is well known: it was to devise a notion of proof that is defined in purely syntactical terms, so that every form of inference has its syntactical counterpart which can be put on paper. This enables one not just to check a proof through mechanical procedures, but also to evaluate which premisses a proof ultimately rests upon, because what was previously only in the thinking mind of the mathematician and only half-way expressed, becomes intersubjectively assessable. In the introduction to his Grundgesetze, Frege describes his own standard of proof in comparison with Dedekind's as follows:
My purpose necessitates many departures from what is customary in mathematics. The requirements on rigor of proof inevitably entail greater length; anyone not bearing this in mind will indeed be surprised at how laboriously a proposition is often proved here . . . This will strike us particularly if we compare Herr Dedekind's work Was sind und was sollen die Zahlen? . . . In much less space it pursues the laws of arithmetic much farther than is done here. To be sure, this brevity is attained only because a great deal is really not proved at all. . . . an inventory of the logical laws taken by him as basic is nowhere to be found, and even if it were, there would be no way of telling whether no others were actually used; for that to be possible the proofs would have to be not merely indicated but carried out, without gaps. (Frege 1893 (Frege -1902 All of this is well known, but worth recapitulating in the context of the Frege-Hilbert controversy, which is, after all (at least in part), a controversy about proofs of a particular kind, namely, independence proofs.
A further point must be kept in mind: Frege criticizes Hilbert for taking pseudo-propositions as axioms, that is, strings of signs which only apparently express thoughts, but which contain variables and consequently do not express thoughts at all. Frege concludes that such conditions cannot serve as axioms if the word 'axiom' is taken in its traditional sense. But he goes a step further: he is claiming that an axiom is a thought! For something to be a candidate for an axiom it is not only necessary to express a thought, but to be a thought. In other words, Frege is claiming that in considering the dependence or independence of genuine axioms, we are concerned with thoughts as the objects of investigation. For Frege, sentences are just the audible or visible expression of what is relevant to the question of (in-)dependence, and as such, they only have physical properties (cf. Frege 1906, p. 101) . This is an important point for Frege which will occupy us later.
Frege's New Science, Informally
As I have emphasized earlier, Frege's concerns should not be seen as a full-scale rejection of Hilbert's arguments. At the time that Frege wrote his article on Hilbert's Foundations of Geometry, the independence of the axiom of parallels from the remaining axioms, for instance, was as certain as something could be. Frege is neither questioning the independence itself nor the possibility of proving this fact. The issue here is rather what an acceptable proof of this well known fact must look like and what kind of methods should be employed. As we have seen, Frege blames Hilbert's independence proofs for either being misguided (in case they are meant to apply to genuine axioms) or irrelevant (because the word 'axiom' is understood in the sense of 'condition'; hence a proof of independence concerning such conditions has no obvious bearing on the genuine axioms corresponding to them). So the question is this: What, according to Frege's standards, are the correct means to reach those well known results if genuine axioms are considered?
Three commitments concerning independence proofs are apparent from his outline in the final part of his 1906 paper. The first has already been mentioned in section 2: the kind of things we are concerned with, when we ask ourselves if some axiom is independent of others, are thoughts. As Frege puts it:
What I understand by independence in the realm of thoughts may be clear from the following. I use the word 'thought' instead of 'proposition', since surely it is only the thought-content that is relevant, and the former is always present in the case of real propositions-and it is only with these that we are here concerned. (Frege 1906, p. 103) Again, in Frege's terminology 'propositions' ('Sätze') are just marks on the paper or soundwaves. Hence, they cannot be said to be (in-)dependent in the relevant sense just as tables or chairs cannot be said to be (in-)dependent in this sense. It is just in virtue of its expressing a thought that a proposition becomes logically relevant in the first place.
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The second point concerns the question of how independence is defined. Roughly, is it defined semantically in terms of truth or is it defined proof-theoretically in terms of inferences? This is Frege's answer:
Let Ω be a group of thoughts. Let a thought G follow from one or several thoughts of this group by means of a logical inference such that apart from the laws of logic, no proposition not belonging to Ω is used. Let us now form a new group of thoughts by adding the thought G to the group Ω. Call what we have just performed a logical step. Now if through a sequence of such steps, where every step takes the result of the preceding one as its basis, we can reach a group of thoughts that contains the thought A, then we call A dependent upon the group Ω. If this is not possible, then we call A independent of Ω. The latter will always occur if A is false. (Frege 1906, p. 104) 
13
The talk about 'logical inferences' makes it reasonably clear that Frege's conception of independence is meant in the sense of 'non-provability'. It must be mentioned, however, that the concept of provability employed here-i.e. applied to thoughts-must not be confused with the relation of provability as applied to sentences. I shall come back to this issue.
The third point is related to an interesting general feature of Frege's strategy and reveals an important aspect that every attempted interpretation of his stance towards independence proofs has to take into account. Let me quote the entire passage:
We now return to our question: Is it possible to prove the independence of a real axiom from a group of real axioms? This leads to the further question: How can one prove the independence of a thought from a group of thoughts? First of all, it may be noted that with this question we enter into a realm that is otherwise foreign to mathematics. For although like all other disciplines mathematics, too, is carried out in thoughts, still, thoughts are otherwise not the object of its investigations. Even the independence of a thought from a group of thoughts is quite distinct from the relations otherwise investigated in mathematics. Now we may assume that this new 12 As far as the 1903-1906 articles are concerned, Frege never distinguishes clearly between expression types and expression tokens. Throughout the 1906 paper the word 'proposition' ('Satz') is used in the meaning of sentence token. Frege, however, was aware of the distinction, as a letter to Dingler suggests (Frege 1976, p. 35) .
13 For Frege, axioms are true thoughts. Thus, if the thought expressed by ϕ is an axiom, the thought expressed by ¬ϕ will trivially be non-provable from some given set of axioms ϕ. More generally, no false sentence (or 'thought') can be provable from ϕ, assuming that the notion of proof is 'sound'. realm has its own specific, basic truths which are as essential to the proofs constructed in it as the axioms of geometry are to the proofs of geometry, and that we also need these basic truths especially to prove the independence of a thought from a group of thoughts. (Frege 1906, p. 106) Frege's forthrightness about his suggested method of proving independence in this passage is striking: it reveals that Frege wants to establish the independence of real axioms in an axiomatic framework in the traditional sense, that is, by invoking basic truths about thoughts. As we shall see shortly, one of the main reasons for bringing up such basic truths is to provide links between provability and truth as needed in independence proofs. As I mentioned earlier, one by-product of Frege's logicist project was the rigorization of the notion of mathematical proof, which was needed in order to trace those basic truths on which the truths of arithmetic would ultimately rest. So if the non-provability of some axiom from other axioms should be capable of being proved, we have to ask the same question for proofs of this kind too: which basic truths about thoughts, truth and provability are needed in order to prove the non-provability of some genuine axiom from others?
In his outline, Frege offers three axioms of the New Science, which he thinks is needed for genuine independence proofs. Two of them are stated explicitly in the following passage, which I quote again in full:
The basic truths of our new discipline which we need here will be expressed in sentences of the form:
If such and such is the case, then the thought G does not follow by a logical inference from the thoughts A, B, C.
Instead of this, we may also employ the form:
If the thought G follows from the thoughts A, B, C by a logical inference, then such and such is the case.
In fact, laws like the following may be laid down:
If the thought G follows from the thoughts A, B, C by a logical inference, then G is true.
[henceforth, (NS 1)] Further, If the thought G follows from the thoughts A, B, C by a logical inference, then each of the thoughts A, B, C is true. [henceforth, (NS 1 )] (Frege 1906, p. 107) As mentioned earlier, one thing that Frege seems to be missing in Hilbert's exposition of his independence arguments, even if his talk about interpretations, systems of things, etc. were reformulated in a way acceptable to Frege, is a link between the notions of truth with respect to an interpretation and provability. One presupposition of Hilbert's arguments, if they are supposed to show independence in the sense of non-provability, is that the notion of proof employed therein is sound, that is, that everything provable from premisses that are true under a given reinterpretation is itself true under that reinterpretation.
14 Both 'basic laws' above-that is, (NS 1) and (NS 1 )-are meant to provide just this kind of missing link, which, according to Frege, Hilbert would have needed as premisses of fully regimented proofs even if the informal notions of proof and truth with respect to a reinterpretation had been spelled out. Nevertheless, (NS 1) and (NS 1 ) are clearly insufficient for independence proofs.
14 Evidently, this condition is met on any reasonable explication of truth with respect to an interpretation and provability. However, by 1906, Frege had already received the letter from Russell. What he once assumed to be a system of purely logical laws and rules of inference turned out to be inconsistent after all. So it is understandable that he could not take for granted that proof preserves truth (in an interpretation), as long as the notions of 'proof' and 'truth with respect to an interpretation' have not been rigorously defined.
But before we look at what is missing, a clarifying remark concerning Frege's 'basic law' (NS 1 ) might be needed. In brief, (NS 1 ) is an expression of Frege's often articulated view that something can be proved only from premisses that are true. According to Frege, a genuine proof should establish the truth of its conclusion, which naturally requires the premisses from which it proceeds to be true. But this piece of Fregean doctrine should not prevent us from construing provability in a way that dismisses the notion of truth altogether. True: Frege conceives of the possibility of regarding proving as a kind of game without paying attention to the truth of the premisses-and openly rejects it! But the sole reason for doing so is precisely because we would be left in the dark as to the truth of thereby established conclusions.
15 To keep things straight though, in subsequent sections, we will understand provability in a sense that excludes the requirement that the premisses be true. As we shall see, this is not a serious departure, since 'Fregean provability' could still be defined by means of provability (in this sense) together with a truth predicate (the necessity of which will be discussed in the next section).
What, then, is needed additionally, in order to be able to carry out 'gapless proofs' of independence that will meet Frege's Begriffsschrift standard of proof? As we shall see in a moment, Frege is clear about the fact that, in a sense, we do the same thing in proving the independence of genuine axioms as in the case of conditions, namely producing a 'counterexample' of some sort. Due to Frege's and Hilbert's diverging views on language, however, Frege feels that the same idea must be implemented differently in the case of genuine axioms.
To elucidate what he has in mind as a surrogate for the Hilbertian counter-interpretation method, he wants us to conceive of a language, a whole consisting of meaningful expressions (that is, expressions equipped with a fixed sense as well as a reference).
16 Think of the language of Euclidean geometry as an example of such a language. As Frege acknowledges, one might follow Hilbert in expressing the axioms of Euclidean geometry by means of the primitive terms 'point', 'straight line', 'plane', 'congruence', and 'between'. Besides these primitive terms, the language includes the usual logical apparatus consisting of variables, truth-functional connectives, and quantifiers. Frege then invites us to think of the expressions of this language as forming a list of increasingly complex expressions built up from the primitive terms by means of quantifiers and the truth-functional connectives. Frege's suggested new law then amounts to the following: if each expression of such a list is coupled with an expression of another list, consisting of expressions of the same language in such a way that (a) every expression is coupled with an expression of the same grammatical category and (b) the logical expressions are coupled with themselves, then every valid proof containing only expressions from the first list can be converted into a valid proof containing only expressions from the second list. In short, according to the new law, provability is invariant under substitutions of non-logical terms.
Frege's talk about 'lists of expressions' and 'coupling expressions with expressions' can be straightforwardly restated in terms of a function f that 'translates' (simple or complex) expressions of the first list into expressions of the second. Thus, by generalizing slightly on his central idea, Frege's point can be made more precise by defining a Frege-translation (henceforth, F-translation) as a function f from a language L to a language L which meets conditions like the following:
The clauses here should be straightforward. For instance, (iii) states that the F-translation of a negated sentence is the negation of the F-translation of the original sentence. Similarly for the other logical constants listed here. The way Frege apparently wants to proceed then, is as follows: given some F-translation f , mapping expressions to expressions and thereby preserving their logical structure, we can correlate a function s f with f , mapping senses of expressions to senses of expressions according to the F-translation f . Call such a function a sense-translation (henceforth, Stranslation).
17 With these stipulations at hand, and employing the notation ϕ * , referring to the thought expressed by ϕ, Frege's new law, which he calls an 'efflux of the formal nature of the logical laws' (Frege 1906, p. 107) , can be stated as follows:
Now suppose we want to prove that the thought ϕ * , expressed by the sentence ϕ, is independent of the thought S * , expressed by the conjunction of some set of sentences S. Suppose further that ϕ and S are formulated in a language L and we are given an F-translation f mapping the primitive terms of L to terms of some language L . As we have assumed, f will induce a function s f mapping ϕ * and S * to thoughts s f (ϕ * ) and s f (S * ) respectively. Furthermore, suppose we can show that s f (S * ) is true and s f (ϕ * ) is false. Now, if ϕ * were provable from S * , then, by the new law, s f (ϕ * ) would be provable from s f (S * ) and hence true by the laws (NS 1) and (NS 1 ). But, by assumption, s f (ϕ * ) is false. Contradiction. Hence, ϕ * cannot be provable from S * . This informal sketch evidently leaves a lot of things open. An often-made complaint about Frege's suggested method is that it presupposes an account of what belongs to logic. As we have seen, Frege's method relies on the notion of an F-translation, which was defined as a function on the vocabulary of a language that leaves logical constants fixed. So Frege should have been interested in delineating precisely what the logical constants are; otherwise we would not be sure whether his independence test yields correct results. Indeed, Frege was perfectly aware of this problem. In his 1906 paper he writes (p. 109): 'To logic, for example, there belong the following: negation, identity, subsumption, subordination of concepts. And here logic brooks no replacement.' However, as is apparent from the subsequent remarks, he does not seem to think that the problem is thereby solved (p. 110): 'In particular, we will find that this final basic law . . . still needs more precise formulation, and that to give this will not be easy. Furthermore, it will have to be determined what counts as a logical inference and what is proper to logic.' Although this question is important, I will not discuss it in any further detail here, since nothing in the reconstruction that follows depends on the particular choice of the logical constants. I simply refer the reader to some of the relevant literature.
18 The points I find most interesting in Frege's proposal are of a more general methodological character; so it seems to me that Frege's proposal bears several interesting questions even modulo the problem of the logical constants. Some of these will be discussed in more detail in the following sections.
Frege's New Science, Reconstructed
It is well known that Frege was reluctant to endorse his own approach to independence proofs. As I have mentioned, he explicitly brings up the problems of the logical constants and which forms of inference belong to logic, problems he thinks need to be settled in order to prove rigorously the independence of genuine axioms. As we shall see though, a lot more is left open by his sketch. Although Frege's New Science has received some attention in the secondary literature, it seems to me that, so far, little has been done to spell out how exactly it would have looked liked.
19 To fill this gap, I will propose a precise reconstruction of his New Science, based on the implicit commitments that-following Frege's outline-I shall develop in this section. In the subsequent section, I will discuss what is left out by the reconstruction and why.
If we look at the first two axioms that Frege explicitly states-that is, (NS 1) and (NS 1 )-and take them at face value, we see that they contain three devices which do not show up in any of Frege's logical systems:
(i) the notion 'the thought (that) . . . '
(ii) the predicate ' . . . is true' and (iii) the relation ' . . . is inferable from ---'
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To be more precise: none of these notions shows up as an explicit, visible part of his formal systems (neither the system presented in his Grundgesetze nor the system presented in his Begriffsschrift) and none of them occurs in Begriffsschrift-style proofs. Of course, each of them is, in one way or another, part of the conceptual apparatus that is used to elucidate the basic functioning of his formal systems. But the main point of the New Science, as I think we have to conceive of it, is precisely to go a step further and incorporate those notions into a theory. Thus, it seems that at least the items displayed in (i)-(iii) should be among the basic notions which, according to Frege, are necessary to formulate the 'specific, basic truths which are . . . essential to the proofs constructed in it [i.e. the New Science]' and which are needed to prove rigorously the independence of genuine axioms, for it is perspicuity about these notions that Frege perceives is lacking in Hilbert's independence proofs.
To facilitate discussion, we shall, for the moment, disregard the fact that Frege wants truth and provability to be predicated of thoughts. So in the following we will be concerned with sentences only-sentences, of course, which express thoughts and which are definitely true or false and not subject to 'reinterpretation'. (The reason for this restriction will be discussed in more detail in section 5.) What remains then are two basic notions of the New Science: truth and provability. In the following, these notions will be represented by the 18 See Ricketts 1997, Tappenden 1997 for a reply and, especially, Antonelli and May 2000, for a definition of the logical constants in a Fregean spirit. For the sake of definiteness, in what follows, one might think of the logical constants as being exhausted by negation, identity, universal quantification, and, presumably, the material conditional. Something along these lines seems to be indicated in the passage cited above ('subordination of concepts' being definable by means of the universal quantifier and the material conditional).
19 See Antonelli and May 2000 , Blanchette 2014 , Ricketts 1997 , Tappenden 1997 , and Weiner 2005 This locution is to be understood in the sense of ' . . . is inferable from ---by a finite sequence of logical inferences'.
one-place predicate T (x) and the two-place relation P rv(x, y), and a reconstruction of the theory implicit in Frege's suggestion is provided that meets modern standards and is in line with basic Fregean views on language and logic.
The first thing we need to know in order to make Frege's suggestions work, is what the relation between the meta-linguistic notion of formal provability in some calculus and the object-linguistic provability relation P rv(x, y) is. This is a tough question if we were to follow Frege in considering thoughts as objects of the provability relation. To reiterate: although Frege's notion of independence is specified in a broadly proof-theoretical way, that is, in terms of 'logical inferences', we have also seen that logical inferences, according to Frege, are not made within the 'realm of the visible' and, strictly speaking, apply to thoughts. For the moment, however, we are concerned with sentences only, and in order to make Frege's approach to independence proofs work, we need only subscribe to the thesis that formal provability of ψ from ϕ implies that the New Science proves P rv(ϕ, ψ). So in the following we shall adopt a 'necessitation-rule' that allows for precisely such an inference:
(P-Nec) If there is a logical derivation of ψ from ϕ, then P rv(ϕ, ψ) is provable in the New Science where a 'logical derivation' is supposed to be given by a derivation in some Begriffsschriftstyle calculus which is specified by syntactic rules of inference that are accepted as logical. This much, I think, should be uncontroversial. No matter how 'logical derivation' is specified and no matter what exactly P rv(x, y) is supposed to stand for, (P-Nec) should clearly hold.
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In order to be able to state (sentential versions of) the axioms that Frege explicitly mentions, we also need a predicate Sent(x) to sort out object-linguistic sentences from the other objects we want to talk about in the New Science. The sentential counterpart of (NS 1), for instance, is intended to express the universal thought that every provable sentence is true. In order to express this in a single sentence, we need a predicate Sent(x), which will sort out those objects that are said to be true if provable. (To warrant better readability, I will use variables ϕ, ψ, . . . , which are intended to range over sentences only.) The fact that in the axioms (NS 1) and (NS 1 ) Frege intends to generalize over sentences (or rather the thoughts they express) is also related to a further issue: the need for a truth predicate. One might wonder whether Frege's use of a truth predicate in his formulation of the 'basic truths' (NS 1) and (NS 1 ) was merely for elucidatory purposes and not to be taken seriously. However, if we grant that (i) the New Science contains some general truths about truth and/or provability
(ii) that those general statements are to be expressed by means of first-order quantifiers and (iii) that first-order quantifiers have to be interpreted objectually then there seems to be no way to avoid the use of an ineliminable truth predicate on pain of ungrammaticality. The same is true if we want to generalize, like Frege, over thoughts 21 As the label suggests, (P-Nec) is intended as a rule of inference similar to the necessitation rule in modal logic. (P-Nec) allows us to derive, within the New Science (applied to a particular 'object theory'), a statement of the form P rv(ϕ, ψ), whenever we can derive the object-linguistic sentence ψ, by a purely logical deduction, from the object-linguistic sentence ϕ. This much is analogous to the usual rule of necessitation in modal logic, where we can derive ϕ, whenever we have derived ϕ by a purely (modal-)logical deduction. Of course, there are disanalogies as well. Systems of modal logic are usually closed under their respective rules of necessitation. That is, given some deductive consequence relation for modal logic: whenever ϕ, then ϕ. However, in order to make Frege's approach work, we do not need such a version.
(as opposed to sentences), as long as thoughts are assumed to be first-order entities. Thus, regardless of whether Frege was fully aware of this, I take him to be committed to the use of an ineliminable truth predicate to express his axioms, for I think that each of the requirements (i)-(iii) must be attributed to Frege. 22 Thus, keeping in mind the points concerning (NS 1 ) made in the previous section, we can restate Frege's two basic truths in a single axiom in the following way:
Notice that, if the ineliminable truth predicate turns out to be undefinable, truths about this notion must show up as further axioms of a fully developed New Science. The need for such truth axioms in the particular context of Fregean independence proofs becomes evident on looking back at Frege's principal sketch of how independence is to be proved. Suppose, for instance, that we want to establish the independence of the axiom of parallels P from the rest of the axioms of Euclidean geometry G. According to Frege's suggestion, we would have to find an F-translation f (defining some non-Euclidean geometry) so that the F-translation of G, say G f , is true and that of P , say P f , is false, that is, not true. Therefore, among the consequences of the New Science, as applied to geometry, we must have T (G f ) and ¬T (P f ). But how do we establish T (G f ) and ¬T (P f )? It seems natural to proceed as follows: we first look for some theory that is accepted as true, say, the axioms of ordinary Euclidean geometry G * = G ∪ {P }, and then prove G f and ¬P f from this theory.
23 By (P-Nec) then, we have as consequences of the New Science
Frege's law of the efflux of the formal nature (which we shall discuss in more detail in a moment) will then guarantee that if P is provable from G, then P f is provable from G f , that is,
Since the theory from which G f and ¬P f are proved is assumed to be true, among the consequences of the New Science we should also have (4) T (G * )
22 I cannot argue for this in full detail here, but (i) and (ii) appear to be clear from Frege's formulation of (NS 1) and (NS 1 ) and the context surrounding them. As regards (iii), although some (like Dummett) think that Frege's second-order quantifiers have to be construed substitutionally, most commentators agree that his first-order quantifiers must be understood objectually, albeit in a way alternative to Tarski. (See Heck 2007, p. 53 .) It is also worth mentioning that although Frege seems to be flirting at times with some sort of 'deflationary' theory of truth -for instance in the fragment Logic (Frege 1997, pp. 228-9) , and in his On Sense and Reference (Frege 1997, p. 158 ) -this does not imply that he is committed to the view that the truth predicate is eliminable. Even if he believed that the truth predicate were eliminable in some contexts, this does not imply that he thought the truth predicate is of no use. Even deflationists usually grant that the truth predicate has at least one function: to endorse an infinite collection of sentences (or thoughts). And this is precisely what is needed in metatheoretical investigations. Although there is considerable controversy concerning the question whether Frege uses an ineliminable truth predicate in other writings, it is usually conceded that Frege uses one in the 1906 article. Thomas Ricketts, for instance, a distinguished proponent of the 'no-metatheory reading' of Frege, writes (Ricketts 1997, p. 151 ) that 'Part 3 of "On the Foundations of Geometry" stands out among Frege's writings. Here we find unambiguously metalogical reasoning that uses a truth-predicate for semantic ascent.' A similar view seems to be adopted by Joan Weiner in her 2005. For further discussion concerning Frege's use of a truth predicate in the 1906 paper and elsewhere, see also Stanley 1996 and Weiner 2008 . For a more general discussion, see Greimann 2007 and Sluga 2007. 23 Per the properties of an F-translation, ¬(P f ) is tantamount to (¬P ) f . In the following I shall therefore omit parentheses.
As per (NS 1), it follows from (1), (2), and (4) that G f and ¬P f must be true as well. That is, (5) T (G f ) and
If we now assume for reductio, that P rv(G, P ), then from (3) we have P rv(G f , P f ) and so, by (5) and (NS 1) again, we also have T (P f ). However, in order to get an outright contradiction, we would need ¬T (P f ), and not just T (¬P f ) as in (6). This sketch illustrates that in order to get gapless proofs, it is required that (a) if something is proved from G * , then T (G * ) should be provable in the New Science and that
Otherwise, the axioms that Frege mentions (in particular (NS 1) above) would not achieve their intended purpose. Thus, it appears that certain truths about the truth predicate have to be taken as further axioms of the New Science.
24 Since the New Science should be general and not a collection of ad hoc truths, it seems justified to require that it contains something like an axiomatic theory of truth. Although the particular purpose of independence proofs does not force us to go beyond what has been indicated in the previous paragraph, it seems likely that a highly incomplete system allowing only for (a) and (b), would not meet the standards of anything Frege would have called a 'science'. At least certain further axioms for the truth-predicate should be included in such a theory if the New Science is worked out in full generality.
Evidently, it is not clear how Frege would have addressed this issue. Moreover, such a theory of truth would somehow have to consider the semantic paradoxes, most importantly, the Liar-Paradox.
25 However, Frege's writings offer no indication that he ever considered this a problem at all. It seems reasonable though that such a theory should at least imply all instances of the so-called restricted T-schema. That is, for all sentences ϕ in the language of the theory to which the New Science is to be applied:
In what follows, we shall take this as our theory of truth. It should be understood that the choice of this particular truth theory is more or less arbitrary. Although Frege sometimes seems to flirt with a deflationist conception of truth (see fn. 22), there is too little evidence to reconstruct which theory of truth Frege might have endorsed or whether he would have endorsed such a theory at all. The important point here is that his general approach to independence proofs in the 1906 paper, together with (i)-(iii), seems to commit him to using an ineliminable truth predicate and to the idea that some kind of theory of truth is required in order to carry out gapless proofs of independence.
The statement of the last basic law that Frege mentions is somewhat more involved from a technical point of view and reveals an important presupposition for the Fregean approach altogether, which has been implicit throughout this section. Recall that the law amounts to the claim that the provability relation is invariant under substitutions of the non-logical vocabulary (axiom (NS 2) from the previous section or, rather, the version applying to sentences). More precisely, it was stated in terms of F-translations, that is, functions mapping the expressions of some language L to expressions of some language L and preserving logical structure. Now, if (NS 2) is supposed to be a basic truth of the New Science, then in order to state this basic truth, we need to make the notion of an F-translation suitable for Begriffsschrift-style proofs. For instance, we must be able to prove within the New Science, from suitable definitions, that the image of a negated sentence is once again, a negated sentence. More fundamentally, we need to know that certain entities are sentences as opposed to, say, points or numbers, depending on the theory to which the New Science is applied. We must be able to prove that the image of some sentence under some F-translation is again a sentence and that sentences are composed, in specific ways, of certain simpler parts. But first and foremost, we need a device to refer to such syntactical entities. In short, in order to be able to even state Frege's axioms-in particular, Frege's axiom of the 'efflux of the formal nature of the logical laws'-we need a full-fledged theory of syntax. There is no way to obtain Begriffsschrift-style proofs of independence along the lines that Frege advocates in the absence of such a theory. Tarski's painstaking accuracy in setting up his truth definitions teaches us a simple lesson: that every theory of truth or provability needs, as a presupposition, a theory of the objects that are deemed true or provable.
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Such a theory of syntax allows us to define the notion of an F-translation (as sketched earlier) within the New Science and to formulate Frege's new law in the following manner:
We can see then that the system consisting of the rule (P-Nec), the scheme (T), (NS 1), (NS 2), and an adequate theory of syntax is sufficient to provide the basis for gapless, Begriffsschrift-style proofs of independence. Although the details are somewhat involved, proving independence along the lines indicated is routine. Now, I do not wish to claim that the system provided here is the only candidate for reconstructing Frege's approach. It may not even be the best one. But it is one way to make his inchoate thoughts precise and I claim that it successfully captures important traits of a full-fledged New Science as sketched by Frege in his 1906 paper.
Thoughts Again
I have tried to show in the previous section that Frege's general approach to independence proofs can be made precise. However, one of the central motives for Frege's attack on Hilbert has been deliberately left out of consideration. Section 2 of this paper has already discussed Frege's contention that thoughts-not sentences-are the objects of the New Science. But the fact that it is thoughts that are said to be (in-)dependent raises further problems that need to be solved before we can go further.
First and foremost, we require perspicuity concerning the very notion of a thought and the notion of sense in general. In fact, in order to get Frege's method of proving independence in an axiomatic fashion off the ground, we would need an explicit theory of sense. Such a theory would have to provide the necessary links between the syntactical F-translations (mapping expressions to expressions) and their corresponding S-translations on the level of sense (mapping senses to senses). Just as we had to provide a theory of syntax in order to state the Fregean axioms concerning truth and provability when sentences were considered to be the objects of truth and provability, we must now provide a theory of sense as a theory of the objects that are deemed true or provable.
The major problems in this respect are well known. Sentences and expressions (or types/tokens thereof) are usually considered to be entities of a respectable sort and individuated quite transparently. Two expressions are identical if they are composed in the same way of the same primitive signs. Fregean thoughts, on the other hand, are languageindependent, 'eternal' entities. The thought expressed by the sentence, 'In a rectangular triangle, the square of the hypotenuse is equal to the sum of the squares of the other two sides', existed, on the Fregean view, long before any human was able to use language to express this thought and it will continue to exist until no more humans remain. Even if we were to bring Fregean thoughts down to earth, there is no obvious way to describe how exactly such entities would look and how they would be individuated. In particular, there seems to be no obvious structural relationship between a sentence and the thought it expresses. Although Frege often speaks as if the structure of a sentence in a sense mirrors the structure of the thought it expresses, it is by no means clear that this is always the case. There are occasions where he seems to indicate the exact opposite, that is, that two sentences may express the very same thought even though their logico-grammatical structures are vastly different.
28 Although Frege occasionally hints at what he considers to be the identity conditions of thoughts, it is not clear whether these suggestions can be made precise in a way that would make them suitable for the purposes of metatheoretical investigations.
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With regard to independence proofs, a specific problem with Frege's view that thoughts are the bearers of provability has been highlighted forcefully by Patricia Blanchette.
30 Suppose that A and B are sentences of some language, expressing the thoughts A * and B * respectively, and suppose furthermore that by some means we learn that B cannot be proved from A by means of the logical axioms and rules of a some proof procedure. Do we know then, in general, that the thought B * is independent of the thought A * ? It seems not. As Blanchette observes, the fact that B is not derivable from A is no guarantee that the thought B * is independent of the thought A * , because there might be sentences A and B , expressing the thoughts A * and B * as well, but in a more 'fine-grained' way. Conceptual analysis of the simple expressions occurring in A and B, for instance (Blanchette's prime example), might lead us to sentences A and B , which express the same thoughts as do A and B. Yet, the analysis might bring to light structural features that are present in A and B , but not in their 'unanalysed' counterparts A and B. Structural features that might be responsible for B now indeed being derivable from A , thereby establishing that the thought B * is indeed dependent on the thought A * . So letting P rv * (x, y) stand for a Fregean provability relation applying to thoughts, although we clearly want to have the (relatively uncontroversial) principle
it seems that, in general, we cannot have the (for independence proofs) relevant principle 28 This seems to the case with Basic Law V, where he writes that both sides 'express the same sense, but in a different way' (Frege 1984, p. 143 ). Frege's remark has led to some controversy though. For more on the issue see Alnes 1999. 29 For attempts to make precise Frege's notion of sense see e.g. Klement 2002 and Horty 2007 . 30 See her 1996 , and 2014 . See Hodges 2004 for a reply to some of the worries.
Non-provability of the sentence B from A is, in general, no guarantee for non-provability * of B * from A * even if we assume the existence of some calculus exactly codifying what 'belongs to logic'. But if we cannot, at least in some cases, infer from non-provability to non-provability * , we seem to be left with scepticism concerning independence since we are left in the dark as to the logical relations between thoughts. As Fregean thoughts are language-independent and not bound to any particular expression (or, presumably, to any expression at all!), independence proofs that meet Frege's standards might appear 'epistemically inaccessable'; we would never be sure about the existence of expressions A , B of some more 'fine-grained' language witnessing the provability * of B * from A * after all. It is important to realize that the problem mentioned by Blanchette depends on only two simple features concerning thoughts which appear to be undeniable on the Fregean account, namely:
(i) that thoughts themselves are language-independent (ii) that one and the same thought might be expressible by different sentences Hence, in order for the problem posed by Blanchette to be even statable (let alone solvable) in an exact way, we need to understand the notion of a thought and, in particular, what it means for two sentences to express the same thought.
This (very cursory) discussion should have already clarified that the question of whether Frege's original proposal can be made precise depends on the possibility of a worked out theory of sense. In order to ensure the applicability of the approach, we need to be able to state, clearly and unambiguously, the relationship between the theory of syntax and such a theory of sense (the relationship between language and thought), providing in particular the links between formal provability P rv(x, y) and provability P rv * (x, y) in the realm of sense. For reasons other than the lack of space, I will not even attempt to give an outline of such a theory here.
Let us take a quick recap of the situation. After rejecting Hilbert's independence proofs, which rest-from Frege's point of view-on a misconception of what axioms are, Frege eventually sketches how he would handle independence proofs for genuine axioms. The two main features of this proposal are that independence proofs are carried out within an axiomatic framework and that they are based on translations rather than reinterpretations. As shown in section 4, some of Frege's suggestions can be worked out in a way that meets modern standards (although some of them, as we have just seen, seem to resist such treatment). Furthermore, this can be done without moving too far beyond what seems to be contained in Frege's sketch. In the concluding section, we will examine Frege's 1906 approach from a more general perspective.
Axiomatic Metatheory
The reasons for axiomatizing some part of discourse are manifold, at least on the modern, Hilbert-inspired conception of the axiomatic method. A concept may prove so fruitful in different areas of mathematics, that it deserves separate treatment. Algebraic notions belong to this category. The concept of a group, for instance, turned out to be so useful in many different fields such as combinatorics, geometry, and number theory, so that an independent study of it was considered to be fruitful. This pattern is quite general: a bunch of structural properties show up in different areas of mathematics and are singled out for independent investigation. Of course, as we have seen in section 1, Frege does not believe that this practice of sorting out structural properties has anything to do with axiomatization in the proper sense of the term. One might call the properties a structure has to have in order to fall under the concept group, 'axioms'. Yet in Frege's view, genuine axioms are something quite different. Still, some of the reasons for axiomatizing some area of discourse and, in particular, some area of metatheoretical discourse, are the same on both conceptions of the axiomatic method. Let us look at some of these reasons.
Axiomatization has, for different reasons, been used as a tool for providing a framework to prove things about notions that apparently are undefinable (or undefinable in a uniform way) by means of more standard notions. For instance, Gödel once considered axiomatizing the concept of computability in order to decide the notorious Church-Turing thesis (see Shagrir 2006) . Famously, the problem here is that of relating an exact notion (e.g. Turingcomputability) with the informal notion of computability. Although axiomatization did not work out in this particular case, the rationale behind this move seems important and relevant as a partial motivation for Frege's suggestion to prove independence within an axiomatic setting: axiomatization can sometimes provide a framework where hitherto undecidable statements (for instance, due to lack of precision) turn out to be provable or refutable.
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Another example of an undefinable concept, without being ambigous or vague (at least in this particular context), is provided by the concept of truth for some given formalized language. One of Tarski's main conclusions at the end of his 1933 paper was that truth can be defined unambigously for (what he calls) languages of 'finite order', whereas no such definition would be possible for languages of 'infinite order'. He remarks though that 'even with respect to formalized languages of infinite order, the consistent and correct use of the concept of truth is rendered possible by including this concept in the system of primitive concepts of the metalanguage and determining its fundamental properties by means of the axiomatic method' (Tarski 1956, p. 266) . So at this point, Tarski surmised that the concept of truth was incapable of being defined in a uniform way for any given formalized language. But he felt that this should not prevent us from investigating the concept of truth by means of an adequate axiomatization.
A similar example is provided by Myhill's suggestion to axiomatize the notion of absolute (arithmetical) provability (see his 1960). Myhill's key idea is simple: take some formalized arithmetical theory T as a starting point. By Gödel's first incompleteness theorem there is some canonical 'Gödel sentence' G which is neither provable nor refutable from the axioms of T . Still, one can prove this very sentence to be true by means of standard reasoning; hence, G is-in a fairly natural sense-provable after all. Now take T to be T ∪ {G}: T trivially proves G, but T will again contain some Gödel sentence G , which is neither provable nor refutable from T . But again, one can show this sentence to be true, hence G is a provable arithmetical sentence. Take T to be . . . It is important to notice here that each of the arguments establishing the truth of G, G , etc. should count as a proof, though not a proof in a particular formal system of arithmetic. Hence, based on this conception, arithmetical provability does not reduce to arithmetical truth, for there is a clear sense in which each of the G's is established by inferences. Myhill then concludes that one should axiomatize the notion of absolute arithmetical provability, for there is no way to reduce it uniformly by reference to some fixed formal system of arithmetic.
The reasons for resorting to axiomatization provided by the examples above have, each on their own, a specific (often technical) background. But I think two major motives for axiomatization can be extracted from the discussion so far, which seem to be relevant to Frege's proposal concerning independence proofs:
(A) Axiomatization may enable us to investigate concepts that are not reducible 31 Compare this situation with Zermelo's motivation behind his axiomatization of set theory, which was merely to set the stage to prove the well-ordering theorem.
to simpler concepts (B) Axiomatization may enable us to prove things that were hitherto neither provable nor refutable Let us look at (A) more closely. In the preceding sections, we saw that in order to obtain fully regimented Begriffsschrift-style proofs of independence, we need basic truths concerning syntax, thoughts, truth and provability. Now, the question is this: if axiomatization is necessary in order to obtain genuine proofs of independence (as Frege apparently thinks), then in what sense must the notions occurring in these basic truths be taken as 'irreducible' ? Unfortunately, I have no definite answer to this question, but I think one of the main reasons why Frege believes that an axiomatic approach is the only intelligible way to approach the question of independence can be traced to two assumptions that have been discussed already. First, Frege considers independence to be a relation between thoughts. Thus, thoughts are the objects of metatheoretical investigation. Second, he thinks that gapless independence proofs are possible only if we 'introduce into the text itself' the vocabulary that is necessary for such investigations (such as truth, proof, word, etc.). Accordingly, two distinct questions of reducibility have to be distinguished:
(Q1) Are the objects of the New Science reducible to other objects?
(Q2) Are the basic concepts of the New Science reducible to more basic concepts?
In my opinion the answer to (Q1) must be a resounding 'No'. I cannot imagine that Frege conceives of thoughts as being in any sense ontologically 'reducible' to other, more mundane objects such as sets (or extensions), numbers, or points. The situation might be compared with Frege's logicist reduction of numbers to extensions of certain concepts. Although it is not entirely clear how Frege conceives of this reduction, 32 it seems obvious that not just any 'set-theoretic model' will do. Reducibility, according to Frege, seems to always be accompanied by some epistemological constraints. A reduction of some domain of discourse to some other is provided only if it can be shown how knowledge regarding the former domain can be obtained through knowledge regarding the latter. At one point, Frege regarded his logicist reduction as successful because he believed that this reduction could explain how knowledge of numbers could be gained through logical reasoning alone. Yet, I doubt that he considered thoughts to be reducible in a similar way. At any rate, this seems to be his stance in the 1906 paper.
It seems then that a 'No' to (Q1) implies a 'No' to (Q2) as well. If thoughts have to be taken as objects in their own right, then at least some expressions for properties of (and relations between) thoughts have to be introduced into the New Science. Furthermore and as seems natural in this context, if reducibility is at least constrained by definability, then not every primitive concept of the New Science (whatever those may be exactly) can be reducible. Whether this is true of the truth predicate T (x) and the provability relation P rv * (x, y) (as applying to thoughts) is another matter.
33 In any case, what seems to me more important is Frege's apparent conviction that something is involved in independence proofs that is not straightforwardly reducible to standard logico-mathematical discourse and that this 'something' relates to the semantic ascent required by independence proofs concerning genuine axioms. Remember that, according to Frege, independence proofs concerning genuine 32 Are those extensions just surrogates for the numbers or are those extensions literally the numbers themselves? As Joan Weiner (2004, p. 66) asks: 'But are numbers really extensions of concepts?' 33 For instance, it might be possible to define P rv(x, y) (Fregean provability as applying to sentences), by recourse to some syntactic calculus, which exactly specifies which laws and inferences belong to logic proper. Together with basic facts regarding thoughts (and senses in general), P rv * (x, y) then might be definable as well. However, it is far from clear how this is to be executed in detail.
axioms require us to start taking words, sentences and-most importantly-thoughts, as objects of investigation. This point is explicitly acknowledged when Frege claims that 'although mathematics is carried out in thoughts, thoughts themselves are otherwise not the objects of its consideration. Even the independence of a thought from a group of thoughts is quite distinct from the relations otherwise investigated in mathematics' (Frege 1906, p. 106 ). Frege addresses the same point at the end of his 1906 paper:
As long as the word 'axiom' was used as a heading only, a fluctuation in its reference could be tolerated. Now, however, since the question of whether an axiom is independent of others has been raised, the word 'axiom' has been introduced into the text itself and something is asserted or proved about what it is supposed to designate. (Frege 1906, p. 111) Although clouded by his traditional understanding of the axiomatic method, Frege, here and elsewhere in the 1906 paper, shows his awareness of the novelty of metatheoretical investigations and the problems they give rise to. His insistence that '[to] whoever might wish to answer my expositions, I should recommend strongly that he begin by stating as clearly as possible what he calls an axiom, when he calls an axiom independent of others' must be understood against the background of precisely this awareness. Frege's dwelling on a clarification of what the word 'axiom' refers to and what the proper means of establishing the independence of axioms are, must be understood in the light of Frege's apparent conviction that in proving the independence of genuine axioms, we have to cross a border, the border between logical theory and meta-theory. Frege, although still somewhat obscurely, saw that there is such a border and that proving something concerning this new field in a rigorous way requires us to clarify which primitive notions are requisite and what their basic properties are.
On returning to the motive (B)-that is, that axiomatization can provide a framework where hitherto undecidable propositions become provable or refutable-we now see that it is dependent on (A), for if there is something irreducible to independence proofs, then at least some truths have to be taken as axioms outright. If talk about thoughts, for instance, is irreducible to talk about more standard logico-mathematical objects, and if some truths about thoughts are needed in order to prove some theorem, then truths about thoughts have to be taken as axioms. Underlying all of this is the tacit conviction that we should be able to prove at least some metatheoretical statements.
Thus, we can see that although Frege considers metatheoretical investigations to be 'quite distinct' from the more conventional parts of mathematics, his answer to the problems posed by this new kind of investigation is traditional and not too different from the techniques used in the more customary areas like number theory or analysis: We try to isolate basic concepts, set up axioms-that is, basic truths about those concepts-and try to prove further truths from those axioms. Now that something is to be proved about notions such as 'truth', 'provability', 'sentence', 'thought', they need to be made precise and the specific laws governing them must be laid down. In comparing the basic truths of his New Science with those of traditional geometry (Frege 1906, p. 106.) , Frege shows that he is struggling to reconcile his traditional understanding of the axiomatic method with his apparent conviction that we should be able to address metatheoretical issues scientifically and in a systematic way. So his axiomatic approach to independence proofs appears to be a compromise between his traditional conception of axiomatics and his Begriffsschrift standard of proof, on the one hand, and the needs of metatheoretical investigations (as conceived by him), on the other.
Although the matter is complex and a detailed account can not be given here, let me mention, as an aside, another interesting connection to modern logical theory. In their important book, Undecidable Theories (1971), Tarski, Mostowski, and Robinson introduced the notion of relative interpretability, which is defined in terms of syntactic translations.
Here, a syntactic translation from a language L into a language L is defined as a pair δ(x), t consisting of an L-formula δ(x) (a 'domain-formula') and an effectively computable function t, which maps every primitive predicate of L to some L -formula, in such a way that the extension of t to all formulas of L 'respects the logical constants'. So, for instance, the syntactic translation of a negated formula ¬ϕ is, like the F-translation of ϕ, the negation of the translation of ϕ. Similar for the other logical constants. A theory T is then defined to be relatively interpretable in a theory T if every translation of a T -theorem is a Ttheorem. Thus, the notion of a syntactic translation as described here is just a 'syntactic counterpart' of the usual semantic notion of an interpretation or 'model'. Now, it seems to me that Frege's method of proving independence via 'F-translations' and (NS 2) can be fruitfully compared to the modern concept of relative interpretability. Indeed, what Frege's method seems to amount to is, from a modern perspective, that an axiom ϕ can be proved independent of a set of axioms T , just in case T ∪ {¬ϕ} is relatively interpretable in a true theory T .
34 The philosophical payoff from the Fregean point of view is that by invoking translation terminology instead of reinterpretations, Frege can provide an account of independence proofs without rejecting his fixed interpretation conception of languagethat is, his view that expressions of some language come 'immutably equipped' (Antonelli and May 2000, p. 246 ) with a fixed sense as well as a fixed reference that cannot be altered randomly. In considering translations, we no longer have to 'change the meanings' or the like, as we are dealing with entirely different languages. Hence, by relying on translations instead of reinterpretations, one can, in a sense, emulate model-theoretic reasoning without being committed to a picture of language that is sometimes said to be prerequisite for semantically-minded independence proofs. It should also be mentioned that one reading of Hilbert's independence proofs assumes that he too has translations in mind. According to this reading, what Hilbert does in his independence proofs is not literally 'reinterpreting' the non-logical terms in a sense that would require us to 'change the meanings' of the non-logical vocabulary.
35 It would be interesting to know how the Frege-Hilbert dispute would have evolved, had Frege understood Hilbert's methodology in this way. Although it seems clear that a number of major issues would have remained concerning the status of axioms and the axiomatic method in general, it seems to me that at least some sort of convergence with respect to the proper treatment of independence proofs would have been possible.
In conclusion, let me first emphasize that Frege's suggestions concerning independence proofs at the end of his 1906 article can be understood as an important step towards providing a framework for metatheoretical investigations that is compatible with a traditional conception of the axiomatic method. Even though there are major problems with his original suggestion (particularly with his view that thoughts are the bearers of truth and provability), as I have tried to show, his suggestions can be made precise in a non-arbitrary way that respects basic 34 If T is supposed to be true, then T will a fortiori be consistent. Now, if ϕ were provable from T , the translation ϕ of ϕ would be provable from T . But since T relatively interprets T ∪{¬ϕ}, the translation ¬ϕ of ¬ϕ is provable from T as well. So T proves ϕ & ¬ϕ , contrary to our assumption that T is consistent. Hence, ϕ must be independent of T . A few comments should be made here. First, here again, we disregard the fact that Frege wants independence to be proved of thoughts. Second, the syntactic translation (unlike the 'F-translation') of a quantified sentence ∀xϕ will be mapped to a relativized formula ∀x(δ(x) → ϕ(x)). Third, as T and ϕ are assumed to express genuine axioms, T and ϕ will be true by fiat. So we need not come up with a true theory T , relatively interpreting T ∪ {ϕ} to witness that ¬ϕ cannot be proved from T -we already have such a theory! Fourth, even though Frege's method might be fruitfully reformulated in terms of relative interpretability, Frege does not argue in this manner. Instead, he argues via a new basic law (i.e. the law (NS 2) discussed earlier). Unfortunately, due to limitations of space, I have to postpone a detailed discussion of this interesting issue to another paper.
35 In his 2010, Michael Hallett contrasts both readings, which might be called the model-theoretical reading (using reinterpretations in a roughly modern sense) and the proof-theoretical reading (using syntactic translations in a roughly modern sense).
Fregean views on logic and language. His axiomatic approach to independence proofs also draws attention to the important fact that metatheoretical investigations do not take place in 'vacuous space' and that recourse to informality is not a valid alternative either. Metatheoretical investigations have commitments too, and if conducted responsibly, one must make plain what these commitments are. I have tried to make it plausible that the axiomatic way Frege approaches the question of independence should be seen as an ancestor of axiomatic approaches to metatheoretical concepts in twentieth-century logic. This includes attempts to axiomatize the concept of truth and other metatheoretical concepts. Furthermore, some of the concepts employed by Frege-such as the notion of an F-translation-seem to have direct counterparts in modern logic. Frege's awareness that his (or any) approach to independence proofs requires us to first delineate precisely what the logical constants are, also indicates his remarkable logical sense when it comes to uncovering the conceptual presuppositions of some enterprise. Thus, despite being rather sketchy, Frege's suggestions provide connections to important areas of research in twentieth-century mathematical and philosophical logic. And even though Frege does things quite differently from what we are used to from our modern textbooks on logic, it still seems justified to raise the counterfactual question, 'What could a careful thinker like Frege have achieved, had he spent more effort in spelling out the details?' and to answer it immediately: quite a lot.
